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ABSTRACT
Success in the Middle East peace negotiations will lead to
the creation of a new state: the state of Palestine. A new
state with a traumatic history and without natural
endowments requires much creativity in developing man-made
comparative advantages. Because technology is behind man-
made comparative advantage and will be decisive in
determining any nation's competitive edge in the twenty-
first century, this report proposes strategies for economic
development based on the prevailing international trends in
technology change and commercialization.
Rapid technological change, increased cost of innovation,
international diffusion of technology, and increased
competition are new realities that are now fostering more
and more strategic alliances of mutual benefit to companies
worldwide. A strategy whereby the public sector helps the
private sector enter new technology-based businesses through
international strategic alliances is presented through a
case study of the United States-Israel Binational Industrial
Research and Development Foundation (BIRD). BIRD-sponsored
projects between US and Israeli companies are analyzed to
understand the factors that influence the design and
performance of strategic alliances. The case study clearly
demonstrates an opportunity for a nation to increase its
high value-added exports and to enhance a high-technology
sector. It also demonstrates the significance of
international support in the form of strategic alliances
(BIRD-type) as opposed to direct foreign aid in promoting a
nation's economic development, creating mechanisms for
organizational learning, and facilitating binational
relations that may transcend political and cultural barriers
between nations. The implications of such a strategy on the
Palestinian setting are presented through recommendations
for the Palestinian Economic Development Group (EDG) -- a
2
credit institution concentrating at present on industrial
economic development in the Palestinian Occupied Territories
-- the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In incorporating a case
study on the EDG , the thesis documents the environmental
factors which have shaped the business environment in the
Palestinian Occupied Territories.
The thesis addresses the question of whether a high-tech
entrepreneurial region can be planned and whether such
planning can give a competitive edge to a country in a 21st-
century technology. It examines the critical role of
university-industry-financial sector cooperation in
encouraging entrepreneurship and commercializing technology.
To demonstrate the dynamics of such cooperation, an MIT-
spinoff company in biotechnology, built around the invention
of a Palestinian woman entrepreneur, is presented. From the
case of this company, Amira, and models of the high-tech
entrepreneurial region of which Amira was an outgrowth,
strategic implications for the Arab world are drawn. These
implications highlight the viability of a corporate state
venture capital strategy that would facilitate other
proactive long-term strategies which include among others
in-house technology development in the Arab World. The
corporate state venture capital strategy is particularly
recommended for a country in the Arab World like Kuwait
where need exists for coordinating overseas financial
investments with activities of the commercial sector and the
university/research institutes.
Thesis Supervisor: Edward B. Roberts
Title: David Sarnoff Professor of
Management of Technology, and
Chairman, MIT Center for
Entrepreneurship
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CHAPTER ONE
PALESTINE: REUNITING A NATION AND CREATING A NEW STATE
1. Introduction
The economic lives of Palestinians have been fragmented and
their society has been dispersing since the war of 1948 and
the partition of Palestine. However, Palestinians have never
lost courage, determination, a sense of identity, and the will
to return to their homeland -- Palestine. If the ongoing
Middle East peace negotiations succeed, an interim period of
five years is expected before a Palestinian state is
established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This period will
call for much creativity to deal with the challenges of
establishing a new state.
This chapter opens with an historical background of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, followed by their macroeconomics since
the 1967 war. To capture the impact of the environment at the
macro level on the micro business level, the author will touch
on the role of Israeli military permits in controlling the
industry structure and dynamics. Because the Palestinian
credit institutions have recently risen as vehicles for
economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
author touches on these vehicles of change with a focus on the
Palestinian Economic Development Group (EDG) which is the
8
credit institution concentrating now specifically on the
industrial sector.
Because the construction of approximately 182,000 houses has
been identified by the Palestinian leadership as both a
challenge and an opportunity in the process of creating the
state, the author will focus on this industry illustrating the
opportunity yet addressing another challenge in parallel
-- the challenge of consolidating two Palestinian economies,
one crippled by years of prolonged occupation and oppression,
and a more sophisticated Palestinian economy in exile,
represented mostly by Palestinian entrepreneurs who managed to
rebuild their wealth and their technological capabilities in
competitive surroundings.
As we are now at the crossroads of the peace negotiation
process, this chapter will close with a metaphor from an
international context: Bretton Woods and the emergence of the
Marshall Plan. The author concludes with those strategic
thrusts with which the Palestinian leadership has defined the
role of science and technology in future Palestine.
2. Historical Background
Neither the West Bank nor Gaza was a distinct entity before
1948. Both were integral parts of Palestine, a country within
9
the Arab world with a total area of 10,162 square miles or
26,323 square kilometers. Palestine extended from the
Lebanese and Syrian borders in the north to the Sinai
Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba in the Southwest, and from the
Mediterranean in the West to the Jordan river in the east.
The 1948 war was fought as a result of Arab rejection of
British policies for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The
Arabs felt the threat of demographic change in Palestine
resulting from the huge influx of European Jews in the
aftermath of WWII. The Arabs lost this 1948 war, Israel was
established as a Jewish state within historical Palestine, and
over 714,000 Palestinians were left as refugees outside their
homeland in parts of Palestine that remained in Arab hands --
the West Bank and Gaza strip -- and in neighboring Arab
countries (PASSIA 1990 -- all references are documented fully
in the References section at the end of this thesis). In 1967
Israel won a second war against the Arabs, and as a result
additional Palestinians became refugees as Israel occupied the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, now referred to as the Palestinian
Occupied Territories. The West Bank area is 5,800 square
kilometers and the Gaza Strip area is 363 square kilometers
(see map, figure 1 on the following page). Since 1948 the
Arab nations (excluding Egypt since the 1978 Camp David
Agreement) and Israel have existed in a state of war. At the
time of this writing, Israeli/Arab peace negotiations are
underway, giving hope for a new future in the Middle East.
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3. Macroeconomics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Since 1967
In 1987, the year of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada
(uprising) against the Israeli occupation, official estimates
put the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip at 868- and
565-thousand people respectively, excluding the population of
East Jerusalem. According to Hamed & Shaban (1992), the
combined population of about 1.4 million people had a Gross
National Product of $2.49 billion. This is almost negligible
compared to the world Gross National Product which in 1987
amounted to US$18,870 billion. To elaborate, the combined
per-capita GNP of $1717 in 1987 in the Occupied Territories
was slightly lower than that of Mexico ($1830) for the same
year and about one-fourth of that of Israel. Referring to the
figures of the period 1970-1987 listed in table 1 (Hamed &
Shaban 1992), the average annual real growth rates of per
capita GDP were 4.26% for the West Bank and 1.31% for Gaza
Strip. The combined average annual growth rate of per-capita
GDP for the West Bank and Gaza for the same period was 3.46%.
In comparison, the growth rate of per-capita GDP in
neighboring Jordan for the same period was 4.23%.
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Table 1 Basic Indicators of Populai on and National Accounts
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1970-87
(figures in million current U.S. dollars)
WEST BANK GAZA STRIP COMBINED
%GROWTH RATE
Year Pop. GDP GNP Pogp. GDP GNP Pop. GDP
1970 608 123 137 370 52 59 1.7 9.6
1971 623 155 188 370 71 81 2.4 13.8
1972 634 206 262 387 87 115 1.9 17.5
1973 652 248 311 402 114 160 3.3 -4.1
1974 670 415 502 414 157 217 2.8 23.2
1975 675 394 512 426 166 230 1.6 -2.0
1976 683 472 593 437 199 273 1.8 16.3
1977 696 477 601 451 219 295 2.3 -1.8
1978 708 522 650 463 204 288 2.1 16.1
1979 719 595 772 445 263 395 -.7 -2.0
1980 724 826 1020 457 300 449 1.5 16.9
1981 732 682 914 469 297 478 1.7 -7.5
1982 749 749 1016 477 296 491 2.2 8.6
1983 772 800 1110 495 309 553 3.2 -3.9
1984 793 807 1061 510 278 493 2.9 5.1
1985 816 747 958 527 256 411 3.0 -1.0
1986 838 1241 1534 545 366 602 3.0 19.6
1987 868 1313 1718 565 459 773 3.6 -3.8
Despite the apparent growth in GNP, as an indicator of the
economic situation in the Occupied Territories growth in GNP
can be deceiving. One must consider, for example, the Gross
Domestic Product as a ratio of the Gross National Product,
which has been less than 100%. This ratio has been decreasing
and demonstrating increasing reliance on non-domestically
generated income which had reached one-quarter of the income
of the West Bank and more than one-third of that of the Gaza
Strip by the end of the period considered. The
non-domestically generated income is generated from either
transfers or worker remittances, and therefore cannot be
attributed to improved domestic economic conditions. A better
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indicator of the economic situation in the Palestinian
Occupied Territories could be the domestic labor market, which
has remained virtually unchanged over the period under
consideration in spite of an annual population growth of close
to 3%. A computation of the average compounded growth rates
of the domestic labor force has yielded 0.5% and -0.7% per
annum in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively (the
average growth rate of the combined labor force is 0.08% per
annum). These figures demonstrate that the increase in size
of the labor force has been fully absorbed by foreign labor
markets in Israel and abroad (Shaban 1992). These alarming
results demonstrate the economy's inability to mobilize
domestic resources and to achieve growth. To explore the
reasons for this, one must look at more economic indicators of
the Occupied Territories. Table 2 shows figures for the West
Bank (UNCTAD 1992).
Table 2 West Bank: Selected Indicators
(ratios in percent)
Year 1972 1975 1980
Saving/GDP -14 -23 -12
Saving/GNP 12 7 12
Investment/GDP 20 20 32
Investment/GNP 15 15 25
Housing/private investment 69 81 82
Private consumption/GNP 78 90 80
Private consumption/GDP 162 178 142
Public consumption/GNP 10.5 9 6.5
Imports/private consumption 61 67 70
Imports/GDP 62 76 72
Trade balance/GDP -34 -44 -44
Current account balance 23 -39 -55
Trade balance -48 -118 -211
1987
-14
11
30
24
79
79
122
6.9
61
63
-44
-100
-405
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Looking at the domestic expenditure and its components, one
can gather more understanding about the economic situation in
the West Bank & Gaza strip. Private consumption figures
appear extraordinarily high, constantly exceeding GDP, and
composing the largest component of aggregate demand. This
distribution indicates a reliance of the territories on
transfers and remittances from abroad. With private
consumption exceeding GDP, the negative ratios of domestic
savings to GDP can be understood. When foreign flows are
incorporated into the picture, the problem with savings takes
less dramatic proportions. Turning to the characteristics of
private investment, one notices that the bulk of private
investment goes to building and construction works (social
overhead investment) rather than to capital investment
(machinery and equipment). It is noticeable also that imports
from Israel and other parts of the world have been absorbing
a large percentage of national resources. Also noteworthy is
that public expenditure by the Israeli government has been
declining. The economy has been unable to mobilize the
resources available to it into productive investment, for
reasons that include the following:
a. The closure of all banks that were operating in the
Occupied Territories in 1967 by Israel, thus hindering
the mobilization of financial resources from private
savings to business investment.
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b. Political uncertainty about the future of the area.
c. Direct Israeli restrictions which made many economic
activities contingent on the acquisition of permits from
the military authorities.
d. The Israeli policy of random deportations from the
Palestinian Occupied Territories.
Despite the 1967 removal of both geographic and tariff
barriers between the Occupied Territories and Israel, and in
spite of the use of Israeli currency as legal tender, the
Palestinian per-capita GNP in the Occupied Territories is now
only one-fourth that of Israel. Moreover, although the
Occupied Territories have no control of Israeli currency and
have no currency of their own, there have existed systematic
differences between the Palestinian and Israeli inflation
rates, except for the period between 1976 and 1986 (Hamed &
Shaban 1992). These differences would not be expected if the
Israeli economy were not protected, or if there had been a
true two-way movement of goods and services to equate any
price differential between Israel and the Occupied
Territories. For example, although any Israeli product can
enter the market in the Occupied Territories, some Palestinian
products (e.g. pharmaceuticals) are kept out of Israeli
markets because these markets are dominated by the government
or by quasi-governmental Israeli agencies.
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This situation changed to a certain extent after December
1987, when the Palestinian Intifada called for a halt to
purchasing of Israeli products. Israeli products constituted
about 90 of total imports over the eighteen-year period 1970-
1987.
To complement this account of the economic impact of the
Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza strip, we include
two important mechanisms of resource transfer from the
Occupied Territories to the Israeli government (Hamed & Shaban
1992). The first is the involuntary monetary integration of
the West Bank and Gaza strip with Israel, and the resulting
use of the Israeli currency as legal tender. The steady
depreciation of the Israeli currency resulted in Palestinians
storing value in other currencies, mostly the Jordanian dinar
and the US dollar, while Israeli currency has been used
exclusively for daily transactions -- a process which resulted
in the transfer of a significant percentage of the Palestinian
GNP to the Israeli central bank. The second mechanism for
resource transfer is a highly protective Israeli commercial
policy, coupled with a one-sided customs union on the West
Bank and Gaza. The Israeli government collects for itself all
tariff revenues generated from imports to the Occupied
Territories. All policies that affect the external tariff
structure or commodities that flow into the Occupied
Territories, as well as the timing of this movement, are
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unilaterally designed and implemented by Israel. Averaged
over the period 1970-1987 and in terms of 1990 US dollars, a
lower bound estimate of $6 billion to a higher bound estimate
of approximately $11 billion has been calculated by Hamed &
Shaban (1992) as the resource transfer resulting from these
two mechanisms. These two mechanisms are significant, and the
Israeli occupation authorities run their annual balanced
budget without accounting for these transfers that qualify as
income sources.
The above economic account of the impact of Israeli occupation
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip excludes the more significant
cost of opportunities and income foregone as a result of non-
utilization of Palestinian land which Israel has expropriated,
confiscated, or otherwise placed under the control of the
Israeli military or settlers. By the end of 1991, such land
constituted at least 67k of the West Bank, excluding East
Jerusalem which has been completely annexed by Israel.
The situation with water is equally serious. From around 700
million cubic meters annual supply to the West Bank and 60
million cubic meters to the Gaza Strip, some 515-530 million
cubic meters is transferred for use in Israel and its
settlements in the territories (UNCTAD 1992). Palestinians
are strictly forbidden from drilling wells in the Occupied
Territories. A Palestinian in the Occupied Territories has
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access to only about one-fourth the amount of water an Israeli
has access to in Israel, and only one-sixth that of a Jewish
settler in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With respect to
agriculture, only 25% of irrigable land in the Occupied
Territories is under irrigation while 95% of irrigable land
beyond the Green Line is irrigated (Palestinian Delegation
1992). Even some Israeli economists believe that the problem
of water scarcity in greater historical Palestine is
aggravated by Israel's uneconomic use of water in agriculture
(discussion with Professor Shlomo Maital).
4. The Impact of Military Permits on Business
A project proposal by a manufacturing firm for a factory with
a budget exceeding $50,000 requires a permit from the military
authorities in the Occupied Territories. The decision-making
process begins with an application to the Trade and Industry
Military Officer. This application is then distributed to
twelve other military officers, Israeli Intelligence, and the
tax authorities. Project approval is contingent on the
acceptance of all those involved (telephone interview by the
author with Samir Huleileh -- Executive Director of the
Palestinian Economic Development Group in East Jerusalem and
an Economist with the Palestinian Peace Negotiating Team).
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In some cases the Military authorities approve certain
manufacturing projects contingent on cooperation with an
Israeli competitor, especially if the competitor is a quasi-
governmental enterprise. Examples of this forced coordination
with competition was exercised in the case of dairy products
with the Israeli company Tnova, and in the case of a cement
factory with the Israeli company Nesher (telephone interview
with Samir Huleileh).
In a 1991 study conducted by George Murad, Head of the Civil
Administration Industry and Trade Office of Bethlehem, the
ninety manufacturing projects which were approved in the
decade 1980-1990 by the Israeli military authorities were
surveyed: the average time that the decision-making process
took was six years. In another study, the average time was
thirteen years for receiving a telephone line for personal or
business purposes in the period 1967-1990 in the Occupied
Territories excluding East Jerusalem (discussion with Samir
Huleileh).
5. The Rise of Palestinian Credit Institutions
The Palestinian Intifada encouraged the establishment of non-
profit Palestinian credit institutions that would correct for
some militarily imposed market imperfections. For example,
the Economic Development Group (EDG) in East Jerusalem was
20
established in 1987 with the stated objective of encouraging
a self-supporting ideology in the Palestinian economy. This
was expected to result in: (1) reducing dependence on the
Israeli economy; and (2) improving the economic and social
infrastructure in the Occupied Territories. EDG defined its
strategic intent as that of filling funding gaps resulting
from the forceful closure of Arab Banks since 1967 and the
lack of other sources of investment funds. In December 1992,
an agreement was signed between EDG and the other credit
institutions in the Occupied Territories, the Arab Development
and Credit Company (ADCC), and the Arab Technical Development
Corporation (TDC). The agreement aimed at allowing each
credit institution to focus on a specific economic sector and
to coordinate as one financial body that could evolve into a
Palestinian development bank. As a result of this agreement
EDG is now concentrating specifically on the industrial
sector.
According to Samir Huleileh, Executive Director of EDG and an
active participant in the Israel/Palestine Center for Research
and Information (IPCRI), EDG was restricted to projects under
$50,000 until the end of 1991, when the Israeli authorities
shortened the decision-making process from six years to six
months. This has coincided in his opinion with the influx of
new Russian Jews and Israel's need to replace Palestinians
working in Israel by new immigrants, a situation which caused
21
some economists in srael to suggest measures to reduce
Palestinian dependence on job opportunities in Israel and to
divert their job search to the Occupied Territories instead.
In addition to this, the initiation of the peace negotiation
process in the Middle East might have put the situation in the
territories under watch by the US and those Israelis
interested in peace.
There is a new signal by Israel in the Palestinian Occupied
Territories -- the recent approval of the opening of two
Palestinian commercial banks and the reopening of a branch of
the Bank of Jordan in the Occupied Territories. Although this
sounds like a positive signal, it is contradictory that Israel
has enforced East Jerusalem's total close off for Palestinians
in the Occupied Territories since April 1993. This is
extremely serious because East Jerusalem is the economic,
cultural, religious and political lifeline for the Occupied
Territories.
6. Building a Future Palestine: Construction as a Locomotive
In a contribution to the Program for Development of the
Palestinian National Economy, Zahlan (1993) addresses some
challenges facing the future state of Palestine. Zahlan sees
the near future requirement for 182,000 housing units as a
locomotive for the new Palestinian economy and an opportunity
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which could enable Palestinians to build their market driven
technological capabilities across the value chain in the
construction industry including but not limited to consulting
and contracting.
Michael Porter (1990) believes that careful management of the
chain of discrete value-generating activities in an industry,
and the ability of a nation's firms to exploit linkages with
home-based suppliers and customers, can be decisive for the
nation's competitive position in that industry.
In the process of managing such a value chain, particularly in
the construction industry, another challenge remains to be
addressed, the challenge of consolidating two Palestinian
economies, one that was crippled by prolonged years of
occupation in the Occupied Territories and a more
sophisticated Palestinian economy in exile mostly represented
by Palestinian entrepreneurs who managed after the loss of
their homeland in 1948 and 1967 to rebuild their wealth in
intensely competitive surroundings. There are already concerns
among local contractors in the Occupied Territories of the
anticipated wave of competition.
Consolidated Contracting Company (CCC) is a potential
participant in the future construction industry in Palestine.
A case study on CCC is presented by Zahlan (1991). CCC was
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created in 1952 in Lebanon by three Palestinian entrepreneurs
who were able to grow the company to being one of the world's
top 100 international contractors. The three entrepreneurs
Kamal Abdul Rahman, Hasib Al-Sabbagh and Said Khoury were
graduates of the American University of Beirut. Their
entrepreneurship started in Palestine: Kamal Abdul Rahman,
together with the late Emile Bustani, was a founding member of
the CAT construction company and executed projects for the
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in historical Palestine. Hasib
Al-Sabagh set up his own construction company in Haifa where
he secured building contracts. Said Khoury owned an
engineering office in Safad, his home town. In 1948 the war,
the partition of Palestine, and the establishment of Israel
resulted in the loss of their livelihood. Like the thousands
of Palestinians who lost their wealth and were deprived the
right to return to their homes after the war of 1948, these
entrepreneurs had to pursue their careers outside of their
home country. As a result they settled in Lebanon and
established CCC.
With time, CCC established thirteen subsidies in different
countries. It also invested in the development of two firms
which provided offshore technologies for the oil industry:
the first is National Petroleum Construction Company Ltd.
(NPCC) where it owns 30%, the remainder owned by Adu Dhabi
National Oil Company. The second is Consolidated Contractors
24
Underwater Engineering (CCUE), which was consolidated with
Comex M.E. into a new subsidiary called Comex Consolidated
Contractors Ltd., registered in the United Kingdom.
The complexity and scale of some of the mega-projects that CCC
handled, such as the Nizar-Hamarit roadway project in Oman
which exceeded $300 million dollars in value, gave CCC the
chance to build its technological capabilities and
international competence. The wide spectrum of expertise
required by such projects made CCC enter into many joint
ventures and consortiums with large international firms which
facilitated a lot of technology transfer.
7. At the Crossroads
At the end of the World War II, the United States introduced
a new idea: the idea of making the enemy richer. The
interesting thing is that it worked. Nicely put by Thurow
(1992):
When an intense debate raged at Bretton Woods as to what
should be done about the Japanese and German economies,
there were those that argued for the Roman solution-sow
the fields of Carthage with salt and permanently destroy
its economy. But in the end what many at the time viewed
as an extremely naive American approach prevailed. The
American idea was that if countries could be rich, they
would be democratic. If their richness depend upon
selling in the American market, they would be forced to
be allies of the United States. Fifty years later, the
US income went up so did everyone else's.
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As with colonial philosophy prior to WWII, Israel's purpose in
the Occupied Territories has not been to make the enemy
richer. Now with peace negotiations slowly underway between
the Arabs and the Israelis, Palestinians are aspiring for
their independence, the return of the Palestinian refugees of
the 1948 and 1967 wars, and control over their land and water
resources. The Israelis in turn need security and access to
Arab and Islamic markets. One wonders whether another Bretton
Woods could be concluded with the inception of a new Marshall
Plan for the friend and the foe devastated by the wars of the
past forty-five years in the Middle East: a Marshall Plan
that would put an end to forceful shifting of natural-resource
endowments; a Marshall Plan not based on forms of charity from
the rich to the less privileged which have already proved
ineffective and devastating in the Arab world, but rather, a
Marshall Plan that will enable all parties to build their own
man-made comparative advantage, and implement strategies for
productive employment.
As technology is behind man-made comparative advantage, it is
the premise of this report that technology-based business
strategies are not only central to the creation of the
Palestinian future state, but also may become means to
facilitate win-win situations and creative resolutions to
disputes in the Middle East. In the Program for Development of
the Palestinian National Economy, the role of science and
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technology in future Palestine is defined by the Palestinian
leadership (Zahlan 1993) with a number of strategic thrusts
that carry implications for the strategies discussed in the
following chapters:
a. to orient the economy of future Palestine towards export.
b. to ensure no monopoly on activities leading to the analysis
and formation of science and technology policies in the
future Palestinian democratic society.
c. to adopt methods aimed at assisting private investors and
entrepreneurs upon whom the economic future of Palestine
will depend.
d. to establish linkages between researchers and consumers of
research through appropriate financial sponsorship and
incentives.
e. to foster close and mutually beneficial economic
relationships with other nations with special emphasis on
the Arab states.
The chapters that follow do not offer a comprehensive
technology-based solution to the complex problems of either
the new Palestinian state or the Middle East. This thesis does
not propose to spell out a Marshall Plan; however, by bridging
the gap between the macro and micro levels of technology-based
business development, and by scanning some relevant
international trends in technology change, this thesis
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presents scenarios that carry strategic implications for the
Middle East in general, and for the Palestinian setting in
particular. Chapter two will present two frameworks for
strategic analysis. These two frameworks will be used in
chapters three and four. Chapter three will concentrate on the
formation of international strategic alliances as a national
technology-based strategy. Chapter four will address the
question of technology-based planned economic development
suggesting corporate state venture capital strategy as an
entry strategy that could facilitate other proactive long-term
technology-based strategies for the integration of the Arab
World in the future world economy.
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CHAPTER TWO
TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
This chapter introduces two frameworks: The Environmental
Analysis Framework and Roberts & Berry's Framework for New
Business Optimum Entry Strategies. The first was developed by
James Austin to modify the popular Michael Porter Strategic
Competitive Analysis Framework in order to capture the
complexity of the business environment in less developed
countries (LDCs). The second framework was proposed by
Roberts & Berry principally for firms in developed countries
entering new businesses through the development of new
products-markets. By fusing these two frameworks in the
following chapters, the author focuses on business development
issues in a less developed country without losing relevance to
global trends. Furthermore, fusing these two frameworks helps
integrate the macro- and microeconomic dimensions of new
business development. The strategies presented here for the
entry of firms into new businesses can be pursued as national
strategies by viewing a nation-state as a corporation.
Implementation of some strategies presented here will be
analyzed through case studies in the following two chapters.
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2. Environmental Analysis Framework (EAF)
James Austin (1990) proposes a systematic way of analyzing the
business environment, and the variables that shape it, through
the Environmental Analysis Framework (EAF). The EAF starts by
categorizing the multiple environmental variables that impinge
on a business into four factors: economic, political,
cultural, and demographic. These factors influence each level
of the firm's environment, starting from the most distant
international level, to the national, to the industrial, and
finally to the company level (Figure 2).
Figure 2 Environmental Analysis Framework
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Environmental Factors
The EAF probes the four broad environmental factors through
their more specific components: The EAF subcategorizes the
economic factors into natural resources, labor, capital,
infrastructure and technology. Political factors include
stability, ideology, institutions, and geopolitical links.
The cultural factors in the EAF are subdivided into social
structure and dynamics, perspectives on human nature, time and
space orientation, religion, gender roles, and language. And
finally, the subdivision of demographic factors includes
population growth, age structure, urbanization, migration, and
health.
Environmental Levels
The environmental factors listed above influence each level of
a firm's environment. The EAF shows that these levels are
interactive, meaning that actions on each level by any of the
environmental factors can affect the other three levels.
i. The International Level
The emphasis here is first on the normal market transactions
that link LDCs to each other and to the Developed Countries
(DCs). Second emphasis is on special bilateral linkages
such as trading agreements that join an LDC to another
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country. Third, multilateral mechanisms such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fourth is on the global
industries and corporations that link LDCs to other
countries.
ii. The National Level
Given the central role of the government in shaping the
business environment in an LDC, the emphasis here is on
government strategies which are expressed in national
policies. These policies, Austin states, are not always
explicitly stated in LDCs. To understand them, one must
analyze their implementation via policy instruments and
institutions. Three broad categories of policy instruments
are identified in the EAF: legal mechanisms such as tax
laws, administrative mechanisms such as industrial capacity
licenses, and finally, direct market operations where a
state-owned enterprise participates in the economy as buyer,
seller, creditor, or facilitator. While these policy
instruments and institutions affect industries and firms,
the latter through their actions can influence policy-makers
and alter national strategies and implementation mechanisms.
The result is what Austin calls the "Public-Policy Impact
Chain" (Figure 3). The comprehension of the iterative nature
of the process illustrated in the Public-Policy Impact Chain
can be empowering to LDC firms and industries. The
iterative nature of the Public Policy Impact Chain
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emphasizes the responsibility that the business community
should bear in the economic development process. It also
describes a powerful mechanism for societal democratization.
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Figure 3 Public Policy Impact Chain
iii. The Industry Level
Porter's "five forces" (1985) are defined as follows:
intensity of rivalry (between actual competitors),
substitution pressures (from potential substitutes),
barriers to entry (against potential competitors), suppliers
bargaining power (as suppliers benefit from selling to
industry firms), and buyer bargaining power (from customers
exerting their influence). To these, Austin adds the "mega
force" of government actions thus modifying Porter's model.
In addition to adding a sixth force, the EAF modifies
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Porter's framework by explicitly exploring the role of the
four environmental factors -- the economic, political,
cultural, and demographic -- in shaping each of the six
competitive forces so as to enable managers in LDCs to
undertake more comprehensive and meaningful competitive
analysis.
iv. The Company Level
The EAF was designed to help managers systematically
identify and analyze the implications of the environmental
factors on strategic decisions and operating actions at the
firm level.
3. Roberts & Berty's Framework for Optimum Entry Strateqies
In the process of technology-based new business entry, two
basic strategic questions are addressed by a firm:
a. Which products-markets should be entered?
b. How should these products-markets be entered most
successfully?
To answer the second question, Roberts & Berry (1985) proposed
a framework based on whether the new business addresses new
markets, new products, or both. The framework applies relevant
literature to create a matrix that clearly shows, depending on
a firm's degree of familiarity with a technology and a market,
the optimum entry strategies from a set of options that
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include internal development, acquisition, licensing,
strategic alliances, and minority investment of venture
capital.
Although a literature review by these authors find that the
familiarity of a company with a technology or a market is the
critical variable that explains much of the success and
failure of new business approaches, Roberts & Berry propose
entry strategies even for the extreme situation where both the
technology and a market may be new to a company, a situation
that is not favorable yet might be inevitable in a developing
country that is building its economy from scratch and willing
to experiment, take risks, and learn.
To understand the proposed framework one should understand
first how the framework defines a company's "newness" and
"familiarity" with new markets or new products. To borrow the
definition proposed by the authors:
- Newness of a technology or service: the degree to which
that technology or service has not formerly been embodied
within the products of the company.
- Newness of a market: the degree to which the products of
the company have not formerly been targeted at that
particular market.
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- Familiarity with a technology: the degree to which
knowledge of the technology exists within the company,
but is not necessarily embodied in the products.
- Familiarity with a market: the degree to which the
characteristics and business patterns of a market are
understood within the company, but not necessarily as a
result of participation in the market.
Roberts & Berry do not confine the definition of the market
here to the five competitive forces -- (1) intensity of
rivalry, (2) barriers to entry, (3) substitution pressures,
(4) supplier bargaining power, and (5) buyer bargaining power
which constitute the popular Porter model for industry and
competitive analysis; they include also the appropriate
pattern of doing business that may lead to competitive
advantage. In this sense, Austin's EAF is more relevant to
what is meant here by a market.
Roberts & Berry show that with some simple tests one can
distinguish between "base technologies" and "new
technologies," and between "base markets" and "new markets."
Within the new technology category, they also propose a set of
questions that distinguish a new familiar from a new
unfamiliar technology. The same applies to new markets.
Consequently, Roberts & Berry place this new business
conceptually on a 3x3 matrix.
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Having defined a framework for entry status, Roberts & Berry
used their literature survey to fill the 3x3 matrix with
suggested strategies for new business entry, depending on a
firm's entry status. The result is The Technology-Market
Familiarity Matrix (Figure 4), slightly modified by the author
to include strategic alliances wherever joint ventures (JVs)
were suggested initially by Roberts & Berry.
Market
Factors
New
Unfamiliar
New
Familiar
Base
Base New New
Familiar Unfamiliar
Technologies or Services
mbodied in the Product
Figure 4 Optimum Entry Strategies
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Joint Venture Venture
Ventures/ Capital Capital
Strategic or or
Alliances Venture Venture
Nurturing Nurturing
or or
Educational Educational
Acquisitions Acquisitions
Internal Internal Venture
Market Ventures Capital
Developments or or
or Acquisitions Venture
Acquisitions or Nurturing
(or JVs/ Licensing or
Strategic Educational
Alliances) Acquisitions
Internal Base Internal "New Style"
Developments Product Joint
(or Development Ventures
Acquisitions) or (Strategic
Acquisitions Alliances)
or
Licensing
Internal development
Here only in-house resources are exploited as a basis for
establishing a business new to the company. Although internal
development had been one of the traditional routes for new
business development of large firms, this tendency is
subsiding in the face of rapid technological change, increased
cost of innovation, international diffusion of technology, and
increased competition. These new realities are fostering more
and more collaboration between companies worldwide. These new
realities are discussed further in the following chapter.
For technology-based start-ups, Roberts thinks that in
pursuing an internal development strategy a firm could be
adopting a focused strategy of building a critical mass of
technological skills for a closely related product portfolio,
believing that the distinctive competence achieved in its core
technology will become the basis of lasting competitive
advantage. After building an internal critical mass of
engineering talent in a focused technological area, successful
firms usually target a focused set of customer needs, then
gradually broaden the group of end-users (Roberts 1991).
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Acauisition
Acquisition is the second traditional route for new business
entry. Acquisition enables a firm to move very quickly in a
diversified way into somebody else's established market/
technology position. This is particularly adequate if key
parameters for success in the new business field are
intangible, such as patents, or R&D skills which are difficult
to duplicate via internal development within reasonable costs
and time scales. Roberts regards acquisitions of companies in
unfamiliar market and technology areas as strategic fallacies.
Even related acquisitions are not risk-free. The usual near-
term outcome of the acquisitions of small technology-based
companies in the United States has been the loss of key
people: the founder-entrepreneur, the primary talent upon
which the acquired company was based (Roberts 1986).
Licensing
Licensing is acquiring a technology but not a company. It
allows the exploitation of the experience of firms who already
developed and marketed the product.
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Internal venture
In contrast to the internal development discussed earlier, in
this strategy a corporation enters different markets or
develops substantially different products from its existing
base business by setting up a separate entity within the
existing corporate body that would exploit different
diversification opportunities. Roberts finds mixed records in
this approach. 3M has been the most consistently successful
firm in this strategy. Their success has been a result of
their ability in harnessing and nurturing entrepreneurial
behavior within the corporation.
Joint ventures or strategic alliances
Joint Venture (JV) is a term that has been used in literature
to refer to various forms of collaboration starting from those
entered on a contractual basis -- thus representing the
simplest legal structure -- to those entered on corporate
bases, i.e. involving the formation of a corporation whose
shares are owned by the JV partners. The latter type is the
traditional form of Joint Ventures referred to in the Roberts
& Berry's Familiarity Matrix. From this point on, the term JV
will be used in this thesis to refer to this traditional form.
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A Joint Venture has its own administrative hierarchy for
setting general operational and strategic policies, and its
governing body is usually composed of representatives from
both companies. Some advantages to this form of Joint Ventures
stem from both partners' equity positions that help align
incentives and lower the risks. Other advantages stem from the
legal protection that partners enjoy with respect to the
technology or other strategic assets which might develop from
the Venture. But these JVs entail costs that make this more
hierarchical form of governance appropriate primarily for
longer-term projects that involve heavy capital or
technological commitment from both parties.
To explain firms' motivations to Joint Ventures in general,
three theories were developed (Kogut 1988): the transaction
costs theory, the strategic behavior theory, and the
organizational learning theory. The transaction costs approach
argues that firms transact by a mode which minimizes the sum
of production and transaction costs, whereas the strategic
behavior posits that firms transact by a mode which maximizes
profits through improving a firm's competitive position.
Studies to date show evidence for both market power and
efficiency. But while evidence of market power supports the
strategic behavior theory, evidence for efficiency is
consistent but not confirmatory of the transaction costs
theory. Kogut finds that the two theories are complementary
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and not substitutes, and as such, while concentrating on
strategic behavior helps analyze the selection of partners and
the stability of a joint venture in the context of competitive
positioning, the transaction costs theory can be complementary
in analyzing problems, for example in bilateral bargaining.
The organizational learning theory, on the other hand, rests
on the theme that a joint venture can be used as a vehicle by
which organizationally embedded knowledge, tacit knowledge, is
transferred. There are of course many difficulties associated
with transferring tacit knowledge.
Strategic symmetry between partners is key to JV success
(Harrigan 1987). This symmetry occurs when partners possess
complementary strategic missions, resource capabilities,
managerial capabilities, and other attributes that have a
strategic fit such that the relative bargaining power of the
partners is evenly matched. According to Roberts, in the case
of small- and large-company JVs, this symmetry erodes with
time in favor of the large company. This is a reason for the
more popular strategic alliances between small and large
companies. lavacek et al. and Roberts find the latter more
interesting than the traditional JVs which in their view have
limited life and/or growth potential.
Hlavacek et al. and Roberts first defined the "new style"
Joint Venture in 1984 as one where a large and a small company
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combine their complementary comparative advantages to create
a new entry into the marketplace. Such a "New Style" joint
venture does not entail the formation of a third company.
Although this form of JV is also labelled "direct strategic
co-investments," the label that really became popular for them
is "strategic alliances." The latter label and others, such
as "corporate partnering" and "corporate collaborations,"
sometimes take broader connotations and are not restricted to
alliances between large and small which Roberts and Hlavacek
et al. found unique and interesting.
Roberts (1986) makes a distinction between two kinds of
alliances, one strategic and one operational. He describes the
strategic as those with the objectives of entering into new
industry, achieving growth and/or diversification, or trying
to preserve a primary business. The operational alliances in
his definition are not strategic at all. They are attempts to
improve incrementally the performance of the current
businesses.
Corporate Venture Capital
The Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) strategy permits some
degree of entry with the lowest level of corporate commitment.
Major corporations have exploited this approach with the
intention of creating "window" on new technology or merely
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making a good return on invested funds. The window on
technology is particularly appealing because major new
business areas have evolved from innovative high-tech small
companies.
Roberts & Yates (1991) found venture capital firms to be the
key deal source for the more strategically successful CVCs.
Successful CVCs were found to first invest in venture capital
funds as venture capital limited partners, then to take more
proactive long-run approaches which link the venture capital
strategy with broader venture and business development
strategies: coupling with internal ventures, forming strategic
alliances, engaging in some small company acquisitions, doing
some related R&D internally, and so forth.
Roberts emphasizes that companies considering a venture
capital strategy must be very careful in choosing the pooled
funds to work with. He recommends working with more than one
fund. He also identifies the criterion for choice to be
compatibility between the objectives and attitudes of the
corporation and the venture capitalists being screened.
Venture Nurturing
In situations when the investing firm provides managerial
assistance to the recipient of the venture capital fund, the
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strategy is classified as "venture nurturing" as opposed to
pure venture capital. Roberts & Berry find this strategy a far
more sensible entry strategy into new businesses than simply
providing funds.
Educational Acquisitions
Roberts & Berry find acquisitions for educational purposes a
faster route to familiarity than the venture capital "window"
approach. A potential drawback in this approach is that it
usually requires a higher level of financial commitment than
venture capital minority investment which increases risk.
These acquisitions must be designed carefully to insure that
key people do not leave soon after the acquisition as a result
of removal of entrepreneurial incentives.
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CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the case of the United States-Israel
Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation
(BIRD) which encouraged the emergence of similar binational
models in other settings. As of 1991, thirty-nine countries
had approached the United States Department of Commerce to
establish programs extending from the BIRD model. The first
extension from the US-Israel BIRD program was the United
States-India Program for the Advancement of Commercial
Technology (PACT), followed later by the Program for
Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research (PACER). These two
programs will be touched on in this chapter. This chapter
concludes with a case study of the Palestinian Economic
Development Group, in order to demonstrate the implications of
international strategic alliances on the Palestinian setting.
Methodologically this chapter will view a nation-state similar
to a corporation and as such Roberts & Berry's framework will
be used in the analysis of Israel's development strategy
behind BIRD. As most BIRD projects do not involve the
establishment of a third organization, the term strategic
alliances will be used for the BIRD projects.
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Working also within Austin's Environmental Analysis Framework,
BIRD will illustrate how this development strategy and the
national business environment implementing it, are being
shaped not only by national but also by international
economic, political, cultural, and demographic factors. As
mentioned, technology is defined within the economic factor in
Austin's Environmental Analysis Framework and as such the BIRD
case will illustrate how technology in one country, the US in
this case, carries competitive implications for a company in
another country, Israel in this case.
2. US-Israel Binational Industrial Research and Development
Foundation (BIRD)
A. Historical Background
BIRD was established in 1977 by the governments of the United
States and Israel to promote and support non-defense
industrial research and development alliances between US and
Israeli companies. BIRD is financed through an endowment --
initially $60 million, later raised to $110 million -- that
was contributed equally by the two governments. BIRD cost-
shares 50:50 with each partner in a US company-Israeli company
alliance. If the budget of the Israeli company for the project
is x and the budget of the US company for it is y, BIRD would
invest half the total budget, i.e. 1/2 (x+y). BIRD does not
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acquire equity stakes in companies it supports. If a project
fails, all parties lose the money invested; if it succeeds,
BIRD receives royalties -- a pre-tax expense to the payer --
up to a maximum of 150 percent of the BIRD investment.
The concept of the BIRD Foundation was developed in the United
States-Israel Advisory Council, formed in 1976 during the
Carter administration. The agreement first emphasized R&D
collaboration, and was later expanded to encompass R&D and
commercialization. As such the cooperation includes all
applied scientific activities needed in the process through
which an innovation becomes a commercial product, including
product engineering and manufacturing.
There are three categories of BIRD-funded projects with
different formalities associated: full-scale projects, which
have a total budget in the range between $200,000 and
$2,500,000 and a total duration between one to three years;
mini-projects, which have a total budget of less than
$200,000; and tests of feasibility of new concepts, which have
a budget of $60,000 or less.
In its first ten years of existence, BIRD funded 106 full-
scale projects and 50 mini-projects and tests of feasibility.
Out of these, 44 percent, or 69 projects, led to the sale of
a new product. Out of these 69 projects, 18 had sales of over
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$1 million and 2 had sales of over $100 million (Yahalomi
1991).
By end of 1992, BIRD had started its 330th project and had
invested about $92 million so far as its 50 percent cost-
share. Of these projects, 175 led to sales. BIRD claims that
the total business generated to the benefit of companies in
the two countries as a direct or directly traced result of
BIRD support is in the vicinity of $3 billion (BIRD 1992
Annual Report).
B. The Israeli Environmental Factors
Two Israeli factors are relevant to BIRD formation and
progress, one is the economic and the other is political.
Since its establishment in the aftermath of the 1948 war, the
Israeli government realized that Israel is too small to
achieve an efficient scale of production in many industries by
serving its own domestic market alone. It also realized that
lack of natural resources meant investing in human capital,
encouraging R&D, and building a strong scientific and
technological infrastructure that will support an export-
oriented economy. Until 1991 there were over fifty-thousand
scientists and engineers in Israel, of which about ten percent
were engaged in industrial R&D. This number is increasing
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with the influx of Russian Jews. Exports of Israel's high-tech
industries have grown from nearly $300 thousand in 1978 to
nearly $3 billion in 1991. The free-trade agreements between
Israel and the European Community and between Israel and the
US further promote hi-tech exports from Israel (Yahalomi
1991).
C. The US Environmental Factors
Two US factors are relevant to the BIRD case, the first is
technology, the second is political.
Technologies affecting most industries are changing rapidly,
breeding greater need for strategic alliances worldwide. To
understand this, one may think of technologies as living
organisms with S-shape life cycles, from birth, to growth, to
maturity, to old age. These life-cycles for both products and
processes are relentlessly being shortened, and the
displacement of mature-to-aging technologies by upstart new
ones has become endless and fast, posing new challenges to
firms worldwide, including those in the US. Foster (1986)
showed that S-curves come in at least pairs: "The gap between
the pair of S-curves represents a discontinuity -- a point
when one technology replaces another.... Companies that have
learnt how to cross technological discontinuities have escaped
a trap." As the frequency of these technological
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discontinuities is on the rise, firms in the US, as elsewhere,
are realizing that their in-house capabilities no longer
suffice. The speed of technological change, in addition to
rapid imitation, has increased the speed with which new
technologies must be commercialized to the point that few
firms have the time to assemble all the requisite capabilities
in-house. It can be added that the costs of innovation have
increased markedly, decreasing the ability of any single firm
to make it alone. International diffusion of innovation is
decreasing the probability of any one firm, even a
multinational, to command all relevant experience for a
particular project.
On the political level, the United States government, in
pursuing this BIRD program, was among other things seeking a
mechanism for supporting developing nations that would bypass
the problem of aid monies falling into the pockets of
government officials, not into the hands of the people or the
free market. The strong Jewish lobby in the US had influenced
the US decision in making Israel the first country with whom
to share a bilateral industrial agreement.
D. BIRD Projects' Evaluation Process
Once a US company and an Israeli company have decided on a
project, the formalities associated with proposal preparation,
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evaluation, and decision-making are dependant on the category
of the potential BIRD project. For mini-projects, formalities
associated with proposal preparation are minimal and the
Executive Director of BIRD makes the decision without outside
review of the proposal. For full-scale projects the process is
more demanding: The evaluation process starts with tentative
assessment of the merits of the potential project by BIRD
staff. If the venture looks worthwhile BIRD requests a
business plan. BIRD usually gives guidance in developing the
business plan. Two to three months after the business plan is
finalized, BIRD sends it to the Israeli Office of Chief
Scientist (IOCS) and to the US National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to get their assessment of the technical
feasibility of the proposed project. Upon receiving these
comments, BIRD undertakes a thorough analysis, taking into
consideration the venture's expected future cash flow, the
Israeli company's competitive position, and the likelihood of
the American partner's benefit. At the completion of this
stage, BIRD sends the results to three board members in each
country. Final project approval is conditional on the consent
of four of the six board members.
A strategically important element for BIRD is the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) which provides
accurate measurements, including comments on technological
feasibility, technical abilities of project personnel, the
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reasonableness of the implementation time horizon, and
proposed budget. NIST is a US government organization with a
broad base of knowledge and experience. It was established in
1901 to aid manufacturing, commerce, government, and academia
through developing the standards, measurement techniques,
reference data, test methods, and calibration services that
help ensure national and international measurement
compatibility. NIST operates on an annual budget of $260
million (60 percent from the Congress, 30 percent from other
government agencies, 10 percent from the private industrial
sector). NIST employs a highly skilled staff of 3000 and
controls some of the premier research and testing facilities
throughout the United States. The reputation of NIST adds
great credibility to the proposed venture. Some companies
would not invest in projects without the approval of NIST.
The IOCS is an Israeli government agency that operates under
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. IOCS evaluates projects
on the basis of the level of technological innovation. IOCS
claims preference for projects that demonstrate the potential
for the expansion of scientific manpower and result in
products with high value-added that are likely to be
competitive in international markets. IOCS lacks the personnel
and resources to review projects adequately (Yahalomi 1991).
It does not assess the management, marketing, and financial
capabilities of the applicant firms. In response to the
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question of what BIRD can learn from IOCS, sent to sixty
Israeli companies, 79 percent indicated that BIRD can learn
nothing from IOCS. One of them is quoted as saying: "BIRD can
learn how not to work from IOCS" and another saying: "Chief
Scientist is too closely tied to Israeli bureaucracy."
E. BIRD's Involvement in the Strategic Alliances
In principle, BIRD finds the deal between two partners
entirely their affair, not BIRD's. Unless specifically invited
BIRD does not get involved in deal formation (BIRD 1992 Annual
Report). Companies, however, are required to issue a progress
report to the foundation on a semiannual basis. In addition,
BIRD staff visits companies and reviews their technological
development, internal accounting, and commercialization
progress. In Yahalomi's study (1991) fifty Israeli companies
were asked to mention one change in BIRD's policies or
procedures that they could suggest. Only 31 percent suggested
no changes to BIRD due to total satisfaction, while 24 percent
suggested more involvement by BIRD in the form of continuous
monitoring of the projects, active role during partners
disagreements, more help in selecting the partners in the US,
or more mentoring. Sixteen percent of respondents called for
different resource allocation and focus such as allocating
more of the money to the Israeli company and targeting only
small companies. Sixteen percent called for more resources
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and funds, especially to finance he marketing stage. Fourteen
percent called for more flexibility in terms of repayment to
BIRD or eliminating the dependency on the Israeli Office of
the Chief Scientist.
In response to a question addressed to 59 Israeli companies,
in Yahalomi's study about what Israeli companies had learned
from BIRD's partnership, 35 percent gave answers related to
partner relationship management such as "Importance of having
strong project managers in both companies involved,"
"Importance of face to face interaction," or "Two companies
must be equally committed to the overall success of the
project." Thirty-three percent of the responses indicated a
marketing lesson, such as "Spend more time and resources with
your customers in learning their needs and integrate them
fully in the R&D process," "The specific demands of the US
market," and "To define the market niche more carefully."
Twenty percent of the responses indicated that the greatest
lessons were in technology/R&D. Addressing the same question
to 38 US companies, 45 percent of the responses indicated that
the greatest lessons were related to partner relationship
management. Some quotations from US companies were "Spell out
payback responsibilities carefully," "Be more selective in
choice of partner," and "Be prepared for communication/
cultural problems." Twenty percent of the responses were cost-
related: "Off-shore development is possible. Can give low cost
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benefits to US partner"; 18 percent referred to marketing
lessons: "Control the marketing in the US" or "Need to do
more of market study." Ten percent of the responses spoke of
time as the key to success; and finally, 8 percent spoke of a
need to administer and plan the project jointly.
With respect to the initiation of contact with US companies,
Yahalomi's study showed that BIRD had not initiated contacts
with US companies in more than 3-7 percent of the total
sample. In a phone interview with the previous Executive
Director of BIRD, Dr. Mlavsky, he attributed these results to
the fact that Yahalomi's data was relatively old and that in
the past three years BIRD had actually initiated the contact
in about sixty percent of the BIRD projects. Dr. Mlavsky
associates this improvement with the development of BIRD
Information Tracking System (BITS), a computer information
system that is now utilized at BIRD.
A crucial point raised by Dr. Mlavsky is that BIRD is now
targeting American companies that have high growth rate, not
those that are large. The wisdom behind this is that medium-
sized US companies are most likely to engage the company
president himself in the BIRD project, ensuring a higher
degree of commitment from the US partner.
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F. BIRD Companies' Motivation for Strategic Alliances
A survey by Yahalomi (1991), including 97 Israeli and 51 US
companies involved in 110 BIRD projects, showed that access to
the US market was the main motive of Israeli companies in
entering a BIRD partnership. A second motive was access to
financial support from the BIRD foundation. For US companies,
on the other hand, financial support from BIRD, obtaining
technology, and saving time in R&D were found to be the
critical considerations in entering an alliance with an
Israeli firm.
G. Partner Selection in BIRD Projects
In regard to partner selection criteria, Israeli companies
were found to choose partners on the basis of marketing know-
how, distribution channels, and access to customers of the
potential partner. US companies on the other hand rated
technology know-how as the most important factor in partner
selection. Exploring the influence of nationality/ethnicity in
partner selection, the study revealed that while US firms'
choice was influenced by a firm's location in the holy land,
Israeli firms indicated that Jewish management or ownership of
the US companies were not important in their partnership
decisions.
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In response to questions regarding the contribution of each
partner, 65 percent of the observations indicated that R&D was
conducted solely by the Israeli partner. In no case was R&D
conducted solely by the US partner. On the other hand, 66
percent of the responses indicated that the marketing function
was conducted solely by the US partner. The Israeli partner,
by contrast, was never the sole "marketing" partner. With
reference to market definition, 56.6 percent of the responses
indicated that the US partner was solely responsible for
market definition throughout the product life cycle. In only
27.3 percent of responses was the definition of the market
shared by both the Israeli and US partners.
H. Problems and Disagreements in BIRD's Strategic Alliances
In response to questions regarding key problems and
disagreements in BIRD alliances, Yahalomi's study showed that
the Israeli companies found the principal problems related to
the US partner's commitment, especially when there is change
in the US corporation's strategy. They indicated other
problems as well, including personal communication and the
inability of the US partner to deliver. The US companies as
well cited problems related to the inability of the partner to
deliver, personal communication, partner's commitment, and
trust. The US companies cited more problems, on average, with
a strategic alliance than did the Israelis.
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In studying the correlation between strategic alliance
performance and the scale of projects, two performance
measures for 56 full-scale projects and 26 mini-scale projects
were compared: one being royalties-to-grants measures and the
other being a failure/success variable defined as the ratio of
number of successes to the total number of projects in each
scale category. In creating the failure/success variable,
performance was divided into five levels, only two of which
were counted in the study as successful. One level was the
case where the strategic alliance developed a product that
became a commercial success, or where the strategic alliance
developed a product for the right market in a timely way and
had the potential to become commercially successful judging by
the initial strong sales achieved. The empirical findings of
a model linking strategic alliance performance to a variety of
factors showed (Yahalomi 1991) success to be positively
correlated with the size and age of the Israeli company. From
a commentary statement by the BIRD office in Boston on the
issue of size, it appears that BIRD has a preference for
larger Israeli firms. "Bigger Israeli firms are more likely to
succeed due to their better managerial skills which give them
better understanding of the dynamics of international
partnerships. It is also less risky for us." Unfortunately,
Yahalomi's study is not clear as to whether the suggestions
for more mentoring by BIRD, more involvement by BIRD in
partnership selection, and deal structuring were voiced mostly
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by smaller Israeli firms, but this is a reasonable assumption
based on the available information.
The relationship between industry classification and the
performance of the venture, as measured by the success/failure
variable for 110 projects, indicates a significant industry
effect on the strategic alliance performance. The largest
share of success occurred in the software industry (43.5
percent vs. 25.4 percent on other hi-tech sectors), and within
the software industry full-scale projects had a greater rate
of success (70 percent) than mini-scale projects (23 percent).
The superior performance of the software industry was
supported also by a high royalty-to-grant ratio of 21 percent.
Despite the small sample taken, communication and
semiconductor devices appeared to have performed reasonably
well while the machinery and the equipment sector seemed to
have performed weakly. In the Israeli data base (97 projects),
software industry has a lower mean time (18.4 months) in
comparison to an average time of 23.65 months spent on R&D for
all projects combined.
I. Remarks on BIRD
The BIRD example reveals that not only national but also
international environmental factors carry competitive
implications for local firms operating in an LDC. The meshing
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and the exchange of core competencies between the
technologically innovative but organizationally and
managerially less mature Israeli firm and the US partner who
has market access and more marketing expertise explain the
premise of BIRD strategic alliances. Methodologically a
nation-state can be viewed as a corporation, and as such
Roberts & Berry's framework (presented in the previous
chapter) lends itself easily to the explanation of a strategic
alliance as a strategy based on the complementary technology-
market variables brought by BIRD partners.
The fact that there is little sharing between the Israeli and
US partners in market definition appears problematic, since in
today's rapidly moving and highly competitive market it is
necessary to employ integrated strategies combining marketing
and technology in the design of new products. Urban & Star
(1991) report that true integration between technology and
marketing occurs only when strategic programs "to make it
happen" have been put in place. They give three mechanisms
that are typically used by firms to support strategies
requiring the integration between marketing and technology:
(1) organizational structures, (2) interpersonal relations,
and (3) analytical support.
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An example of organizational structures that can be formed to
integrate marketing and R&D is an integrated design group
consisting of marketing, R&D, engineering, and manufacturing.
Cultural conflicts are bound to rise when marketing people are
not technically trained, tend to have short-term perspectives,
or prefer structured tasks, while R&D engineers or scientists
lack training in marketing and management, tend to focus on
the long-term, or are comfortable working on unstructured
tasks. Actually, these cultural conflicts are very common
between R&D and marketing people in many settings.
Interpersonal relations and communication can be improved if
the marketing people understand the technology underlying the
business and if R&D people understand the customer needs.
One good example of an analytical support procedure that can
force integration between marketing and R&D is "Quality
Functional Deployment" (QFD). In QFD, customer requirements
are transformed into detailed engineering specifications
through an "integrated design" effort that evaluates
simultaneously alternative product designs and production
processes, taking the end user into consideration as well as
both the functional specifications and manufacturing
constraints and efficiencies.
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With reference to disagreements and problem variables, both
the Israeli and the US companies have cited similar problems
that are not distinct from those which are commonly cited in
strategic alliances formed within a national border. The
question of why such problems rise may find partial
explanation in the cultural differences between marketing and
technology people, touched on above. Other reasons include
overestimating the larger company's distribution capability,
overestimating the smaller company's technological leadership,
inadequate internal structures and incentives for cooperation,
and lastly, power struggles that are amplified due to a common
lack of organizational structure in strategic alliances.
Roberts believes that structuring such an alliance from the
beginning alleviates many conflict problems. In the process of
designing and planning for a strategic alliance he recommends
the following:
First, not only organizational commitments but also personal
commitments should be the basis for strategic alliances.
Second, those commitments demand management time and hence
if one partner does not devote enough senior time to nurture
the relationship, the alliance is bound to fail. Third, the
strategic alliance must be based on mutual trust. Fourth,
the strategic alliance must offer mutual benefits. The
benefits do not have to be the same for all partners: To
one it could be exposure, to the other it could be money,
growth or learning, yet those different benefits need to be
in line with shared expectations up front. Fifth,
independence needs to be preserved for partners in spite of
the fact that expectations are shared.
The finding that larger Israeli firms perform better in an
alliance seems problematic from the point of view of economic
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development and job creation. The previous analysis of BIRD's
involvement pattern suggests that this is due to insufficient
support and mentoring from BIRD, which manifests itself more
clearly in the case of smaller and less experienced Israeli
firms. Mentoring and nurturing small firms is always hard to
do.
In spite of all the problems that leave a lot of room for
improvement at BIRD, the BIRD example shows how a development
strategy based on the formation of alliances can correct for
financial and information imperfection in a developing country
and enhance the capabilities of local high-technology firms.
3. The US-India PACT Alliances and PACER Consortium Projects
As an extension from the BIRD model, two technology-based
development programs for India were launched by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). The two
programs, PACT and PACER, were aimed at addressing the twin
problems in India -- lack of an industrial framework for
commercialization of technologies, and lack of funds for
industrial R&D. The programs attempted to capitalize on the
cost advantage that inexpensive R&D in India would carry to
participating US firms. The two programs also attempted to
target potential markets in India and abroad.
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PACT was the outcome of a 1985 agreement between the US and
Indian governments under which USAID provided a grant of $10
million to establish a technology fund for the promotion and
financing of Indo-US R&D joint ventures/strategic alliances.
Because USAID lacked the staff, it turned the fund to the
Industrial Credit and Investment Corp (ICICI), India's premier
development financing institution. Battelle Memorial Institute
of Ohio was to provide advice to prospective US participants.
PACT finances in the form of conditional grants -- up to
$500,000 -- half the cost of an R&D joint project. Similar to
the case with BIRD, a project must be proposed by a US and an
Indian company as a team, and if it succeeds and results in
commercialization, the R&D joint venture/ strategic alliance
must repay to ICIC up to twice the amount of the grant. If the
project is unsuccessful, nobody pays anything.
The Program for Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research
(PACER) was launched in 1987 by USAID through a grant of $20
million to ICIC, with the objective of bringing about
operational and organizational models in India that would
facilitate the utilization of research in developing and
commercializing energy technologies. The main strategy
underlying PACER is the formation of consortia between energy
sector manufacturers and research establishments and/or end-
user industries, to develop efficient market-driven products
in the energy sector.
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In the consortium projects, PACER puts emphasis on industrial
firms taking the leading role in identifying their knowledge
gaps and finding research organizations and experts to provide
the missing input.
PACER was also structured to provide support for fundamental
research leading to commercialization at a downstream stage,
as well as for energy policy research and analysis. Unlike
PACT, PACER does not require a US partner as a condition for
eligibility; nevertheless, a US partner is strongly emphasized
by USAID. Until June 1992 PACER committed over $7 million to
15 R&D projects, of which three were successfully completed.
Encouraged by the modest success of the first two projects,
USAID has promoted a third program -- Agricultural
Commercialization and Enterprise (ACE) -- with a fund of $20
million.
4. The Palestinian Economic Development Group (EDG)
The policy of EDG is set by a board of trustees whose twelve
members represent a cross-section of the Palestinian society
in the Occupied Territories. EDG's West Bank operations are
managed by a general manager, and a supporting staff that
includes a financial manager, a training officer, four field
officers, an accountant, an administrator, and two
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secretaries. In Gaza, EDG activities are supervised by a
manager who is assisted by two field officers. For the sake of
covering a wider geographic area, EDG opened two regional
offices -- one in Nablus and a second in Ramallah. Due to
curfews and national strikes, the mobility of EDG employees is
quite often restricted. While EDG is supposed to work 292 days
a year, this number dropped to 240 due to political strikes in
the territories, and dropped further to 220 due to forced
closures and curfews imposed by the Israeli military
authorities.
EC has been the major source of funding for EDG. Approximately
80 percent of EDG's capital (approximately $8.5 million) came
from the EC in the form of grants which are distributed to
eligible borrowers strictly on a loan basis. Other main
sources of funding have been the Welfare Association (a
Palestinian institute based in Geneva), and the Arab Fund for
Economic and Social Development in Kuwait.
Until the end of 1992 EDG had supported approximately 342
projects in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza
Strip. By the end of 1992, the aggregate volume of credit
advanced by EDG to these projects amounted to almost $3.4
million. The loans have ranged between $2000 to $77,000 -- on
average approximately $10,000. This is tiny and cannot
possibly be enough to matter to industry.
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Recipients of EDG funds are asked to co-invest in the range of
20-50 percent of the total investment, depending on the size
of the loan. EDG requires 2-3 credible guarantors to co-sign
the loan agreement with a recipient. EDG does not charge
commercial interest on its loans, but in order to cover its
operational expenses, borrowers are charged an annual service
fee of approximately 3 percent of the loan, deducted at the
beginning of the loan from the whole amount. Full repayment is
expected within a maximum of seven years, which includes a
grace period of 6 to 12 months.
When EDG commenced its activities in 1987, the allocation of
funds targeted three groups: women, unemployed university
graduates, and released political prisoners. EDG funded start-
up companies and existing companies. Initially, EDG funded
projects in three sectors: agriculture, industry, and
service. After the agreement of December 1992 with other
credit organizations, EDG now concentrates on the industrial
sector. Apparently dissatisfied with the performance of EDG's
smaller projects and in response to the recent change in the
military authority decision-making process, EDG is now
investing in medium-sized to larger projects with budgets
above $200,000 dollars. According to the responses received
from a questionnaire sent to EDG, EDG now favors companies
with more than twenty employees and more than $1 million in
sales. This might omit some worthwhile start-up companies that
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have reasonable budgets in the range $50-150,000. According to
responses from the same questionnaire, EDG now prefers
companies with more than one founder, and with experience in
marketing. This is very wise and agrees with a research
conducted by Roberts (1991). The following declaration by EDG
is a translation of the recent shifts in direction:
While EDG is committed to continuing its support of small
businesses, it is now clear that larger projects, mainly in
the industrial sector, provide a more efficient alternative
for generating employment, accelerating the manufacture of
Palestinian goods and thereby reducing imports. Projects
receiving a smaller scale of credit will continue to be
funded from EDG's annual budget with particular focus on
groups with unique and specific needs such as the physically
handicapped and women.
No data are available at EDG regarding the total sales
achieved by sponsored projects, but EDG estimates the number
of additional full-time jobs created by EDG-sponsored projects
in the vicinity of 1200 to date. EDG has been measuring the
success of projects by survival only. Out of 385 projects
sponsored by EDG, 325 have resulted in sales; out of these,
290 have repaid part of the loan to EDG, and only thirty have
repaid the loan in full.
According to EDG, no EDG-sponsored project to date has
resulted in exports from the Occupied Territories. This
situation is expected to change, as there are six EDG export-
oriented projects to this date and there will be around twenty
by the end of the year. According to Samir Huleileh, EDG
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Executive Director, the total goods exported from the Occupied
Territories across the Jordan River into Jordan are estimated
at approximately $20 million annually. The goods that are
exported to Israel on a sub-contract basis are estimated at
approximately $150 million annually. The first category
includes stone bricks, processed food, and some metal products
such as welding electrodes. The latter category includes
mostly shoe wear, textiles, and plastic products, which get
re-exported out of Israel.
None of the projects sponsored involve a joint research
project with a university, with the exception of market
studies that are often conducted by economists at local
universities. In principle, EDG has no objection to sponsoring
a collaboration between industry and a university, and neither
do local universities, in the view of EDG. Some sponsored
projects have technology license agreements or contractual
joint projects with European companies; however, EDG was not
involved in initiating or negotiating terms of such
arrangements.
Thus far the role of EC has been limited to organizing
exhibitions for Palestinian goods in Europe, but no attempt
has been made to initiate and encourage collaboration between
European and Palestinian companies. Things might be changing
with the emergence of the EC-funded Palestine Trade Promotion
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Organization (PTPO). Holland has provided an initial fund of
$650,000 for PTPO, which already has an office in Holland. The
EC has awarded a grant of ECU 300,000 for the European-
Palestinian Chamber of Commerce.
EDG has not yet approached EC with a request that aims to
facilitate access to the EC market, as EDG did not see the
small projects it had sponsored until 1992 aimed at export. In
March 1993 Palestine joined Business Net, a computer network
linking European and Middle Eastern companies interested in
exchanging information. EDG has been designated by EC as the
intermediary in the Occupied Territories.
Only with a recent shift in strategy has EDG started to hire
consultants in a systematic fashion to provide advice for the
new medium-scale and larger-scale industrial projects.
The proposals for the "small" projects that were sponsored by
EDG prior to 1993 were mostly simple and not based on market
surveys. EDG did not set standards for market studies
submitted by proposed projects. It does not help in preparing
a business plan, nor has it given courses in preparing a
business plan (a business plan in the form known in the US is
rare in the Arab World).
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It is interesting that BIRD and EDG, coming from two different
cultures and business environments, both favor larger
companies in their efforts of promoting economic development.
This seems disturbing if the objectives were to minimize risk
and mentoring of sponsored companies.
The credibility that EDG enjoys, both in the Palestinian
society and with the EC, presents many challenges and
opportunities for EDG. To be fair one should give credit to
this private organization that has managed to get this far
with limited resources and many environmental restrictions.
However EDG is now facing a big managerial challenge: For a
small private not-for-profit organization, EDG has been trying
to fill too many gaps -- the social welfare gap, the financial
gap, the managerial expertise gap, and the information gap.
For example, their initial attempts to grant funds based on
social need could explain much of the dissatisfaction with
earlier projects, but this should not be mixed with the case
of smaller projects with technical merit and market potential
which might have performed poorly due to a shortage in
mentoring, which again could be too demanding a responsibility
for an organization like EDG.
Meanwhile EDG should incorporate the requirement for a
business plan in their training program. They must make it a
pre-requisite for both small and larger project applications.
72
The experience of Israeli BIRD companies proves that the
BIRD's assistance with the business plan has helped those
companies tremendously in articulating and thinking their
plans through. EDG must make more use of consulting services
to smaller projects. One possibility that EDG might consider
is to spin out a for-profit venturous kind of enterprise that
would provide business incubation to small businesses.
Furthermore, EDG should, with proper management and vision,
experiment with PACER-like forms of consortia between industry
and universities/research institutions in order to help
industry and to enable university staff and new graduates to
generate ideas that could later be commercialized and
sponsored by EDG. To encourage such cooperation, EDG could
consider implementing something similar to the Pellucio
Incentive Plan by which industrial firms would be provided
with budgets, or vouchers, that can only be spent to support
research in a research institution or university (Allen et al.
1983).
EDG should also capitalize on their special contacts with the
EC and PTPO to facilitate experimentation with a BIRD-like
model, with the aim of improving the technological base and
the market access of EDG-sponsored companies.
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The fact that there have been productive forms of cooperation
between Israeli and Palestinian enterprises, especially in the
shoe wear and textile industries, gives hope for the post-
peace era. However, considering that many of the post-peace
future opportunities for Palestinian goods will be in the Arab
markets, it makes more sense that the future post-peace
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian firms be based
partly on Israel's technology base. As such, EDG could
perhaps start sponsoring marketing functions for some existing
industries in the Occupied Territories to enable them to build
their own marketing capabilities and to expand their
downstream opportunities and profits.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HIGH-TECH PLANNED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. Introduction
This chapter addresses the following questions: Can a high-
tech entrepreneurial region be planned, and can such planning
give such a region a competitive edge in a 21st-century
technology?
Because national governments worldwide seek to emulate the
Boston-area pattern of technological entrepreneurship and
Route 128 ("America's Technology Highway"), this chapter will
start by presenting Bygrave & Timmons' model for high-tech
economic development or the Bygrave-Timmons "genetic code" for
a high-tech entrepreneurial region, which they based primarily
on how the Route 128 area (the high-tech industrial region
surrounding Boston) and its twin Silicon Valley (the high-tech
region in California) have evolved. Because MIT played a key
role as a spawning ground for innovation and entrepreneurship
in the region, this chapter will discuss MIT, highlighting how
environmental factors can and should redefine the role of a
university and its relation to industry.
Although Route 128 was not deliberately planned by the
government, there have been deliberate recent attempts to
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design and develop high-tech entrepreneurial regions. Bygrave
& Timmons define a genetic code for high-tech economic
development which can be consciously replicated. An example of
planned development will be presented, illustrating the cross-
fertilization and cooperation of clusters of industry,
academic, and government efforts. The example of planned
development is chosen in this chapter from biotechnology, for
a number of reasons:
First, biotechnology is a 21st-century industry. It is a
brainpower industry, powerful enough to transform a society
and create a national comparative advantage. It can be located
anywhere. Where it will be located depends on who can organize
the brainpower to capture it (Thurow 1992).
Second, the university was the birthplace of the biotechnology
industry. The relationship of, and technology transfer from,
university to industry remains the lifeblood of biotechnology
which breeds many managerial, political, and cultural
challenges that need to be considered.
Third, the commercial opportunities created by the critical
discoveries of universities were developed by small
entrepreneurial companies that owe their existence to
financial backing from venture capital. Both the
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entrepreneurial spirit and venture capital are behind the
United States lead in biotechnology (Bygrave & Timmons 1992).
The example that will be considered is the Worcester-
Massachusetts-based "First Biotechnology Super-Incubator," an
outgrowth of the same environment that created Route 128.
To illustrate how an environment with the "genetic code" can
empower an entrepreneur with determination and brilliance, the
chapter will conclude with the case of Amira, a biotech
company which spun off from MIT and was initially based in the
so-called America's "First Biotechnology Super-incubator." The
case will illustrate some building blocks that make
entrepreneurship and technology venturing possible.
This chapter will conclude with strategic implications for the
Arab World of which Palestine is an integral part. The
implications will incorporate the role of rich Arab countries.
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2. Bygrave & Timmons' Model for High-Tech Economic
Development
Figure 5 illustrates the key precipitating and sustaining
conditions that Bygrave & Timmons see fueling the engines of
economic development. They divide these conditions into
external and internal; the external refer to the environmental
factors which are subcategorized into societal/cultural
values, government policies, research and educational
institutions, and locational factors.
Government policies
.ocational
factors
support 
organizations
Cultural/social
values
Institutions
Figure 5 Precipitating and Sustaining
Conditions for Economic Development
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The model shown in Figure 5 illustrates the external factors
revolving around people, capital, product/service markets, and
support organizations from which new ventures are ultimately
created and developed.
External Factors in the Bygrave-Timmons Model
i. Government Policies
Bygrave & Timmons show the several fronts on which government
policies influence economic development (Figure 6).
Investment/growth incentives
;gulations
anization
Science and R&D funding
Figure 6 Government Policies
Bygrave & Tinmmons agree with Porter (1990) in that there is
"legitimate role for government in shaping the context and
institutional structure surrounding companies and in creating
an environment that stimulates companies to gain competitive
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Socia
advantage." However, they see the purpose of government
initiative in encouraging entrepreneurship.
ii. Societal Values
The elements that embody the determinant cultural/societal
values in high-tech entrepreneurship are illustrated in
Figure 7.
Active Investor participation
Reco
expef
per
Fale socially acceptable
Figure 7 Cultural/Societal Values
A key determinant of the economic development process is the
degree to which a society has a culture that encourages
entrepreneurs, prizes their success, and tolerates their
failure. Bygrave & Timmons believe that successful
entrepreneurs must be visible so they can be role models in
the society, not only to inspire those who seek to emulate
them but also to set a positive tone in the local business
culture for entrepreneurial activities. In addition, active
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investor participation is a societal attribute that is highly
important and reflects a sense of social responsibility and
awareness.
iii. Locational Factors
The proximity to resources such as education and research
institutions, a well educated work force, capital, suppliers
and customers are crucial to high-technology entrepreneurs
(Figure 8).
Local business climate/policies
Industry mixiconcentration
Figure 8 Locational Factors
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iv. Institutions
The group referred to here include universities, research
institutions (both public and private), and large enterprises.
The example of MIT which follows will illustrate how a
supportive value system in a university, combined with
university-industry cooperation, can encourage
entrepreneurship among faculty and staff members (Figure 9).
Private research institutes
Large e'
corn
Faculty and administrative
support of
entrepreneurship
Figure 9 Institutions
3. Massachusetts Institute of Technolocr (MIT)
MIT was founded in 1861 by William Barton Rogers. The MIT
slogan "Mens et Manus," the Latin for "Mind and Hands,"
explains why its logo shows the scholar and the craftsman in
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parallel positions. This logo is symbolic of a culture that
still prevails at MIT.
Roberts (1991) argues that the general environment of Greater
Boston that began during the postwar period, and in particular
the atmosphere at MIT, have played a strong role in creating
"would be" local entrepreneurs. Specifically, he sees that two
environmental factors were at play: first, the redirection of
the university efforts from pure scientific inquiry to solving
of critical problems. Second, the birth and continuing growth
of venture capital which provided funding for new creative
technology-based enterprises.
Roberts explains that World War II defined technology as the
critical element upon which the survival of the nation rested.
This element made universities, especially MIT, redirect their
efforts from pure scientific inquiry to the solving of
critical problems: "the science and its offspring technology
had become the property of the whole nation with an immediate
relevance for all people."
To maintain the relevance of university activities to the
world outside the campus, MIT kept strong ties with industry.
The MIT Industrial Liaison Program, which is the largest
university-industry collaboration in the US, is a
manifestation of this sustained tradition at MIT. The roots of
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this program go back to the 1930s when MIT generated The
Technology Plan, the first effort in the US to link a
university to industry.
With respect to the venture capital industry, the landmark
event in venture capital occurred in 1946 with the formation
of American Research and Development (ARD), the first firm, as
opposed to a private individual, to provide risk capital to
new and rapidly growing firms, most of which were
manufacturing and technology oriented. ARD was in part the
brain-child of Compton, then-President of MIT, a man who
brought MIT into intimacy with the war efforts just as he
himself headed up all national R&D coordination in Washington
(Roberts 1991).
The history and tradition at MIT of involvement with industry
has long legitimized active consulting by faculty of about one
day per week, and approves faculty part-time efforts in
forming and building their own companies. This was extended to
research staff as well. As a result, approximately half of MIT
spin-off enterprises, including faculty-initiated companies
and many staff-founded firms were started on a part-time basis
that allowed the entrepreneurs to first test the water. Most
of the faculty founders remain at MIT. New policies instituted
at MIT, such as those instituted by John Preston when he was
the Director of MIT's Technology Licensing Office, further
84
encourage entrepreneurship: While MIT technology transfer
portfolio has been dominated by licensing MIT-originated
technology to large corporations for fees, John Preston
pioneered the practice of licensing MIT technology in exchange
for founder stock in a new enterprise.
Lita Nelson, the current Director of MIT Technology Licensing
Office, attributes the fact that universities have recently
been turning to venture capital sources to form new companies
to the increasing difficulty in finding licensees among
established companies. This is either because of the well-
known tendency for many large American companies not to invest
in early, high-risk technology that would take many years to
come to the market, or because very few companies are ready to
re-direct already committed and scarce R&D resources inside
the company to work on a university invention that might not
be directly related to their ongoing projects.
In terms of job creation, the impact of MIT has been
staggering. A study done by the Bank of Boston identified 636
MIT alumni-founded companies in Massachusetts alone, with 1988
revenues of approximately $40 billion (approximately a third
of the Massachusetts economy if one includes the secondary job
creation caused by these high-tech manufacturing companies).
Another study, conducted by Chase Manhattan Bank, identifies
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225 MIT spin-off companies in Northern California, with 1989
revenues of $22.5 billion.
John Preston, now the MIT Director of Technology Development,
recently testified before the US House of Representatives
Committee on the Small Business Technology Transfer program
(STTR). The STTR is a three-year pilot program intended to
foster technology transfer from universities, federally-funded
research and development centers (FFRDCs), and other non-
profit research institutions to the private sector through
work with small businesses. Preston (1991) supported STTR on
the following grounds:
First, the usefulness to the American society of any
research is proportional to the interaction between the
generators of the technology (e.g. university
researchers) and the adopters of that technology (e.g.
industry). Second, in America there is a funding gap in
the riskiest stage in a technology cycle in which small
companies are often the only [participants].
Preston believes that the key to willingness to invest for the
long run is the tie between ownership and management, which is
mostly seen in smaller firms. He calls those owners who manage
"creators of wealth," and those speculators in the stock
market "shifters of wealth." Preston's notion of creators
versus shifters of wealth, and his association with owners who
manage, is another manifestation of an MIT tradition that
values the brainpower creation of comparative advantage.
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Porter makes similar observations to those voiced by Preston.
Speaking at the Conference on the Economy held last December
by then president-elect Bill Clinton, Porter said:
We don't have real owners of companies in the United
States. Our average share of stock in the United States
is held for two years only, two years. Our investors are
too concerned with guessing what stock is going to
appreciate in the next six months or a year, rather than
in understanding the fundamental health of the
company.... We're going to need to rethink our system
for investment in the United States. We're going to have
to better align the goals of owners and managers and
employees.
4. The US "First Biotech Super-Incubator" in Worcester
A. Background
Worcester Business Development Corporation's mission is
to promote the common good and general welfare of the
Worcester region; to improve the quality of life for our
citizens by fostering the improvement of their employment
skills and employment opportunities, and to plan, assist
and advocate for the development and expansion of
business activity in our region.
This was the mission statement of the Worcester Business
Development Corporation (WBDC), the development arm of the
city of Worcester, Massachusetts, fifty miles west of Boston.
A few years ago Worcester was noted as a tool-and-dye town
with unemployment rates above 11 percent. Today nearly twenty
percent of the Massachusetts biotech companies and jobs are in
the Worcester area, and the numbers are rising. This is a
result of planned development which started in the 1980s.
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In 1981 the concept of a "medical and related technologies"
research park adjacent to the University of Massachusetts
Medical Center was proposed by the Worcester Area Chamber of
Commerce and the University of Massachusetts Medical School.
In 1982 the state Division of Capital Planning and Operations
(DCPO) began a selection process for a developer for the
research park. In 1983 DCPO designated Worcester Business
Development Corporation (WBDC), an independent not-for-profit
corporation, as the developer of the research park. WBDC is
the primary economic development arm of the city of Worcester.
A land disposition agreement between DCPO and WBDC was
completed in 1984. In this same year the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Research Institute (MBRI) was created by
Worcester business and academic leaders as a non-profit
organization with the goal of establishing an efficient system
to provide biotechnology transfer between academic/research
institutions and the commercial sector. In 1985 Governor
Michael Dukakis, with the support of the state legislature,
created the Massachusetts Centers of Excellence Corporation
(MCEC), a quasi-public agency that was founded to facilitate
technology transfer and commercialization of emerging
technologies through university-industry collaboration. In
1986, MCEC, through its Biotechnology Center of Excellence
program, awarded the initial fund to MBRI to develop an
"innovation center" that would have both a for-profit and a
not-for-profit component. Commonwealth Bioventure Inc. (CBI)
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is the for-profit entity. CBI is referred to as the first
"Super-incubator" in biotechnology which combines business
incubation and seed financing for start-up companies. CBI is
located in the Research Park which is known now as
Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park (MBRP). MBRI is a
limited partner of CBI. A portion of the return on investments
made by CBI forms one of two longer term sources of funding
available to MBRI. The second source is the profit from the
Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park, which collaborate
with CBI to provide low-cost incubator lab space for CBI-
backed companies. MBRI is governed by a board of Trustees
which includes CEOs from Worcester's universities, colleges,
research institutions, and major corporations, as well as the
chairman of WBDC and the president of the Chamber of Commerce.
B. Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Institute (MBRI)
i. MBRI Mission Statement
The mission statement of MBRI is:
The Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Institute (MBRI)
is an independent, tax exempt corporation devoted to
supporting the growth of biotechnology in Massachusetts.
Its Goal is to accelerate the application of modern
biology to socially and economically valuable enterprises
through the creation of new biotechnology-based
companies. Utilizing a unique collaboration of public and
private ventures, MBRI is able to use income generated by
its commercial success to fuel a continuing program of
identifying and supporting new technology as well as
education initiatives.
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ii. The Evolution of a System Model in Planned Development
After eight years of involvement in biotech-based planned
development during which MBRI tried to fill needs in
biotechnology transfer and to build on opportunities in the
process of commercialization, MBRI is now trying to evolve
into an integrated self-supporting system. To have an
integrated, self-supporting system, MBRI has the intent to
operate in four interconnected functional areas:
1. Technology evaluation and transfer
2. Company formation/investment
3. Education and training
4. Reinvestment in basic research
The first functional area would be implemented by The Unified
Office of Technology Transfer, which MBRI managed in 1992 to
form as a consortium of seven academic and research
institutions. The office will function as the internal
technology transfer operation of each participating
institution. In a way this office is trying to emulate the
functions of the MIT Technology Licensing Office. When the
Unified Office of Technology Transfer identifies a research
with a potential to form the basis of a new company, this
research supposedly gets incubated in the new Innovation
Center which deploys its resources to shape the promising
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research into a business entity and works on launching it as
an independent enterprise. This Innovation center was opened
by MBRI last year in the Research Park. It consists of
molecular biology laboratories, biochemistry laboratories, and
shared offices. MBRI has just completed the design for a
Resource Center which will provide information services for
the Unified Office of Technology Transfer and entrepreneurs at
the innovation center. This includes an on-line computer
information system, access to data-banks, technical expertise,
and business counsel. In return for these support services and
the use of facilities, MBRI acquires an ownership stake in the
enterprise. The first tenant, Plant Pharmaceuticals, entered
the Innovation Center just two months ago. MBRI has not yet
hired new staff for the innovation center. According to Marc
Goldberg, MBRI president and Chief Executive Officer, MBRI is
relying on CBI to help with the new Innovation Center.
According to MBRI, in the capital funding stage which follows,
MBRI plans to help tenants in the Innovation Center with their
seed-money funding, which MBRI anticipates from CBI in many
cases.
At the point when a new company goes public or gets acquired,
MBRI expects to get its return on investment from the new
company according to the pre-start-up equity agreement in
addition to a share of CBI profit if CBI had invested in the
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new company. MBRI plans to close the loop by reinvesting these
funds in supporting the activities of the MBRI Innovation
Center and in research, training, and education.
In line with its mission, MBRI has the ambition of
centralizing under one umbrella, maintained by MBRI, those
educational and training programs in Massachusetts that are
needed to support the biotech industry. MBRI plans to
establish an MBRI Educational and Training Resource Center
that would function as a vehicle to fill needs and to build on
opportunities in the three areas of K-12 bioscience education
support, work force training, and community awareness in
biotechnology. MBRI is already engaged in an educational
program which aims at familiarizing teachers and students with
biotechnology.
Reflecting on similar organizational arrangements, Lita Nelson
(1991), the new Director of MIT Technology Licensing Office,
wrote:
While some universities have set up separate foundations
staffed by professionals who identify promising
technologies, conduct market research, write business
plans, seek venture capital, and may even act as an
interim management team for the new start-up, MIT finds
this approach expensive, relatively high risk, and
limited in the number of ventures it can handle, but
offers the advantage that the university may be able to
command a higher percentage of the company's equity
because the presenting package is more complete.
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Unlike MIT, many academic institutions may have neither the
expansive research base nor the experienced technology
transfer capability necessary for assisting entrepreneurs and
attracting industry or the private financial community;
therefore the attempt to create a critical mass of deal flow
through a consortium of universities and the provision of a
system of support for entrepreneurs in the formation stage may
prove rewarding.
MBRI's self-supporting cycle presents an interesting model,
and is worth considering in similar settings of technology-
based economic development. The implementation however, would
not be straightforward.
C. Commonwealth BioVenture Inc. (CBI)
The mission statement of CBI is:
The mission of Commonwealth BioVenture Inc. is to
identify for seed investment the highest quality
biotechnology start-ups and then to nurture and guide
these investments through milestones to create company
value and insure future financing.
CBI sees its core competence in:
1. Entrepreneurial experience in the approach to deal
selection and structure.
2. Biotechnology focus with strong emphasis on products
and early revenue streams.
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3. Unique deal flow through the Massachusetts Centers of
Excellence Program, the Boston venture capital
community, and university and hospital affiliations.
4. Effective participation in organizational structuring
and strategic planning of CBI backed companies.
5. Access to immediate space availability and rent
subsidy at the MBRP.
Since its inception in 1987, CBI has reviewed over 600
business and technical proposals. From these, CBI has selected
fourteen for investment. Amira was one of them. CBI thinks
three to four new deals a year are all they can handle. The
general partnership management team of CBI is: Robert Foster,
president and chief executive officer; Gloria Doubleday, vice
president of operations; and Gustav Christensen, who recently
joined the organization as executive vice president.
CBI identifies five phases in the life of a growing biotech
company: the embryonic phase, the start-up phase, the
development phase, the sales-growth phase, and finally, the
mature phase. Accordingly, they define their roles in each
phase of growth as follows.
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The Embryonic Phase
In the Embryonic phase, the parties involved are at
universities speaking to the technology transfer officer and
faculty members in order to establish the value of the
technology that might be transferred to commercialization.
Their approach here varies from arbitrary to lengthy
negotiation. During the negotiation, they try to establish a
low initial valuation for a potential start-up because they
believe that the lower the initial valuation, the greater the
multiples available for attracting later rounds of capital
investment.
The Start-up Phase
CBI defines this phase as the period when the company is
making a transition from having been a research project at a
university to a start-up company with R&D capability. The
transition takes about a year, during which they help a start-
up company with the mechanical items that make it look like a
company. More importantly, they try to achieve what is in
their opinion the most crucial element for the success of this
phase -- the identification and recruitment of a president and
CEO for the start-up company. By the end of the phase CBI
expects, besides a CEO, a company that:
1. became legally organized and incorporated;
2. established its legal counsel and selected its
auditor;
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3. has patents licensed from the university or is filing
its own;
4. has retained a patent counsel and has begun to develop
its own patent strategy;
5. has begun to hammer out its three-year business plan,
and from this plan a short-term operating plan is
being developed and adopted;
4. is establishing its own board of directors and a
scientific advisory board; and
5. is setting up operations, offices, and laboratory
facilities.
The Development Phase
In this phase, which lasts for two to three years, CBI sees
achieving of an initial product sale key to maximizing a
company's value. CBI sees a potential for several major
milestones allowed for by an initial product sale, among them
are capabilities that a company may build in manufacturing
processes, process control procedures and quality assurance
procedures. CBI believes that a strategic alliance, made
possible after an initial product sale, is a milestone that
leads to increasing the value of a biotech company "by virtue
of the quality of the strategic partner."
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5. Amira
Amira is an interesting entrepreneurial experience in the
field of biotechnology. It is a story of commercializing the
discovery of Rima Kaddurah-Daouk which originated at MIT.
Following her critical discovery, Kaddurah-Daouk, Ph.D.,
together with Paul Schimmel, Sedgwick Professor of Biophysics
at MIT, co-founded Amira in October 1989.
Rima Kaddurah-Daouk, a Palestinian originally from Safad,
received her Ph.D. in Biochemistry in 1983 from the American
University in Beirut. She did research as a Postdoctoral
Fellow in the Molecular Biology Department of Johns Hopkins
for two years, following which she became a Postdoctoral
Fellow at the Molecular Biology & Genetics Department of
Harvard. In 1988 she did additional postdoctoral work in Paul
Schimmel's lab at MIT for a year-and-a-half.
The following description by Lita Nelson, the Director of the
MIT Technology Licensing Office, describes the role of MIT in
the birth of Amira:
Amira is the story of a brilliant and dedicated scientist
who was unusually active in conveying her enthusiasm of
the importance of technology. Initially I was facing a
puzzle: all I had was a brilliant science, yet too early,
a Post Doc, who believed in her science, and her patent.
I knew Paul Schimmel is well known and had himself co-
founded two well known companies. RepliGen was one of
those two. I asked him if he would be willing to
participate in or sit on the advisory board of a start-up
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company built around Rima's discovery. Paul had a lot of
faith in Rima, when he said yes I had a go. Name and
credibility is highly important in this risky business.
In Kaddurah-Daouk's recollection of her early experience with
MIT Technology Licensing Office she said: "They were
excellent. They knew the whole process. They helped me and
enlightened me of the different opportunities I had. I chose
to start-up Amira."
When Lita Nelson contacted Bob Foster, President and CEO of
CBI, known for his exceptional experience with biotechnology
start-ups, he responded immediately, trusting the quality of
deals that come out of MIT. In addition to the competence of
Foster and access to CBI seed money, Lita knew that CBI could
provide the attraction of low to minimal space rent for Amira
at the Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park. Lita Nelson
believes that Amira is part of the articulation process which
evolved for the biotechnology incubator in Worcester. Perhaps
as start-up companies grow, CBI grows with them and keeps
learning.
By superimposing Amira's growth pattern on the five-phase
model, which CBI conceptualized in order to define CBI's
targeted milestones and CBI's nurturing roles across time, in
addition to applying strategic analysis to Amira's acquisition
by RepliGen which took place in November 1991, this section
will analyze the ability of a nurturing venture capital to
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provide guidance and hands-on management to a start-up biotech
company.
Kaddurah-Daouk's sole concern in the first year was to get a
lead product and advance her science. A CEO was never
recruited for Amira although this is stated by CBI as top
priority for the first year. Although CBI claims to take a
back seat only after a CEO is recruited, Amira remained
science-driven and lacked management support. A strategic
analysis of Amira's acquisition using Roberts and Berry's
Familiarity Matrix supports this claim.
The history of the working relationship between Amira's
founders explains the familiarity of RepliGen with the
technological base of Amira prior to acquisition. As such, one
can easily use the framework proposed by Roberts & Berry for
the creation of the Familiarity Matrix to place RepliGen
(prior to acquisition) with respect to the new business
opportunity, which Amira represented, in the new familiar
technology-base market, and consequently one can predict
acquisition as RepliGen's optimal entry strategy. For
RepliGen, this acquisition added potential products that
introduce small molecules as chemical therapeutics. This
addition is of high strategic importance to RepliGen in light
of an ongoing shift in the biotech therapeutics industry from
a biologic to a chemical base. Amira, on the other hand, can
99
be placed (prior to acquisition) in the base technology-new
unfamiliar market on the Familiarity Matrix, which suggests
that a strategic alliance would have been the ideal strategy
for Amira at that time. The prevailing market conditions in
biotechnology support this strategy. According to a study by
McKinsey & Co. and Harvard University, pharmaceutical research
productivity was more than four times higher at small biotech
companies than at leading industrial companies (Blakely &
Nishikawa 1991).
Three pharmaceutical companies were interested in negotiating
a strategic alliance deal with Amira before acquisition and
before Amira had a product -- Hoffman La Roche, BASF, and
Burroughs Wellcome -- but these negotiations never took place.
The option of strategic alliance with these companies was
presented to Kaddurah-Daouk by Craig Jones from Dillon Reed.
In an interview, Jones said:
Rima had an extraordinary mix between molecular biology
and biochemistry. Her knowledge spanned many areas with
both depth and breadth. She was a pioneer and I knew she
was on something very big. I told her she was crazy to
sell, that she can sell the company for five times more
by waiting. I tried to explain to her that pharmaceutical
companies are less interested in ROI than they are
interested in growth. All she seemed to care about was
seeing her science advance. Perhaps, she did not know me
enough at that time to trust me.
CBI does not try to initiate contact with pharmaceutical
companies for the purpose of negotiating a potential strategic
alliance, as they believe that the biotechnology market is
100
efficient in disseminating information. Furthermore, CBI
believes that closing a strategic alliance deal would take six
to twelve months or more. CBI acknowledges that strategic
alliances are very involving. These three points were
expressed in an interview with Gloria Doubleday, CBI vice
president of operations.
Kaddurah-Daouk needed a business infrastructure in place,
needed R&D funds instantly, and like CBI she believed that
negotiating a strategic alliance would take six to twelve
months which was way too long for her science. For Amira
acquisition was more of an operational tactic than a strategic
move.
To complete this story, the continued scientific achievements
of Amira after acquisition show how far-sighted RepliGen was
in its decision to acquire Amira. Amira's success since
acquisition can be summarized as follows:
1. Amira's first lead product is now ready for clinical
trials in cancer therapy.
2. Amira was able to introduce major applications for the
first lead product in cardiac applications.
3. Amira was able to generate second and third lead compounds
that promise breakthroughs in cancer treatment.
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4. It took Amira approximately three years to get from the
initial discovery to the filing of an IND and potential
initiation of clinical trials. This is a phenomenal speed
in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry where
such a phase would normally extend for four to five years.
5. Amira established strong contacts with key clinical
centers who are adopting Amira's products for clinical
trials, such as Harvard Medical School and M.D. Anderson
Medical Center.
For RepliGen, Amira's acquisition was a smart entry strategy
that cost them only $5.5 million, paid in shares from
RepliGen. To this date, the acquisition has been successful.
So far, RegliGen and Amira lost only James Lillie, a highly
competent scientist and an old colleague of Kaddurah-Daouk
from Harvard university. James Lillie was with Amira when it
started. In the acquisition deal, RepliGen tried to hedge and
manage its risk. RepliGen was apparently aware of the general
potential negative outcomes of acquisitions -- the potential
loss of the entrepreneur, the strength upon which Amira was
established, and the emergence of potential competitors if
such an entrepreneur should leave; RepliGen therefore took the
following measures to avoid such outcomes:
a. RepliGen, at the insistence of Kaddurah-Daouk, agreed to
keeping Amira operating its scientific operations
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independently as it was before acquisition and they kept
Amira located separately from RepliGen.
b. In addition to the $5.5 million paid in shares from
RepliGen, RepliGen made the payment of an additional $5
million contingent on the initiation of phase two and
three of clinical trials (milestone payments).
c. RepliGen made the payment of $5 million contingent on
Kaddurah-Daouk's presence in the company, which means that
should her desire for entrepreneurial independence
motivate her to leave Amira, and to waive her rights for
the remainder of the money, she would still be morally
committed to stay for the sake of the small investors who
had believed in her from the start.
d. Kaddurah-Daouk signed a confidentiality and a "no-
competition" agreement with RepliGen.
Although the case is partly a critique of the level of venture
nurturing that CBI provided, the fact remains that Amira was
not only a brainchild of a brilliant scientist and MIT, but
was also an outgrowth of an infrastructure blessed with
entrepreneurial fever. CBI venture capital money was
courageous seed funding that few venture capitalists are
willing to make. Two concerns rise from this case:
1. CBI is looking forward to a future market with many
consolidations/acquisitions which might imply bypassing
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opportunities of strategic alliances that are of broader
strategic value to their backed-companies. This could be
in part a result of the demanding nature of strategic
alliance deals, especially that CBI targets three to four
start-up companies each year to keep CBI financially
viable.
2. CBI might shift to later-stage funding in order to
minimize their risks and to capitalize on their increasing
expertise in biotechnology. This means that there might be
a widening funding gap in the US for pioneer technologies
such as that of Amira.
6. Some Strategic ImDlications for the Arab World
Strategies for high-technology economic development which are
discussed in this chapter are relevant not only to a state in
the Middle East such as future Palestine, which has no natural
resources and is trying to build man-made comparative
advantages for the 21st century. These strategies are also
relevant to a rich country like Kuwait, still considered
almost the wealthiest nation according to its per-capita
assets. Kuwait has a risky and illiquid position due to the
concentration of its wealth in oil and because of the limiting
oil extraction policies which are conducted in the framework
of a delicate web of regional and international political and
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economic realities. A viable investment strategy for Kuwait is
"corporate state" venture capital strategy combined with other
proactive long-term strategies that include but are not
limited to strategic alliances in areas of R&D, manufacturing,
and marketing.
The "corporate state" venture capital strategy could serve as
a window on technology and could result in identifying, within
certain niches, opportunities to develop certain technological
capabilities and related skills in Kuwait. While adopting
developmental perspectives in its investment decisions, Kuwait
could also incorporate financial objectives. Such
incorporation is particularly feasible when investing in small
companies that are leading emerging technologies of the 21st
century. One option for venture capital deal flow may lie in
the existing funding gap in the US, which was referred to by
Preston and is illustrated by the case of Amira's pioneer
technology. As part of a biotechnology-based development plan,
for example, Kuwait might have provided venture capital seed
funding for a company like Amira provided that such a company
would locate within a reasonable time-frame some activities
along the value chain in Kuwait or other parts of the Arab
world like future Palestine. From following such a strategy,
Kuwait could emerge into a high value-added economy based on
man-made comparative advantages, and would transform its role
into a brain nerve in the Middle East. Such a win-win scenario
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would integrate Kuwait into the future world economy while
functioning as a stabilizing economic and political force in
the Middle East.
A natural place for creating a "corporate state" venture
capital activity is within the Kuwait Investment Office, the
government's investment arm and the builder of Kuwait's
financial empire. This office operates as a national pension
fund taking stakes in the world equity and real estate
markets. The adoption of such a "corporate state" business
investment strategy cannot be productive unless linked
specifically to four other strategies: (1) in-house
technology development, through the promotion of local
university-industry collaboration and encouraging research
through appropriate support and incentives; (2) manpower
training and development; (3) infrastructure development; and
finally (4); national awareness.
Taking Singapore as an example, a strategic business unit for
a National Biotechnology Program (NBP) was established in 1988
within the Economic Development Board (EDB) to coordinate
national efforts in the development of biotechnology. In 1990
NBP launched a master plan which spanned the five strategies
listed above. To encourage commercial biotechnology activities
in Singapore, Singapore BioInnovations Pte (SBI) was
incorporated in 1990 to pursue two tracks in parallel: first,
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investing in commercializing indigenous biotechnology
inventions and innovations, and second, investing in viable
biotechnology companies overseas with the hope that overseas
investments would lead to strategic alliances and
collaborations in Singapore. This investment strategy is not
being adopted independent of other national strategies; for
example industry is being encouraged to tap the expertise at
the university through joint research projects or consultancy.
A good example of university-industry collaboration in
Singapore is the Glaxo-IMCB (Institute of Molecular and Cell
Biology) joint research venture on degenerative brain diseases
which Glaxo has provided a $ 50o million trust fund to support
over 15 years.
The Singapore NBP can serve as a model for a country like
Kuwait which has the financial power yet needs to link its
overseas financial investment strategies with local research
institutes and local commercial activities. The following
personal experience at Kuwait University Nuclear Medicine
Department illustrates the lack of technology-based
development policies that would facilitate university-industry
collaboration and commercialization of university research.
Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, nuclear medicine at all
hospitals in Kuwait was managed by the Nuclear Medicine
Department of Kuwait University. In terms of equipment, Kuwait
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had one diagnostic gamma camera per 100,000 people which met
with the US standards. Kuwait University Nuclear Medicine
Department had fifty publications per year on average, out of
which ten were accepted at the annual meeting of the Society
of Nuclear Medicine (SNM) in the US. Outstanding departments
of nuclear medicine in the States who were happy to have two
or three papers accepted at the SNM used to wonder how a group
in the desert could have generated such research. The Nuclear
Medicine Department at Kuwait University won the Gold Prize at
the SNM meeting in 1986, followed by the Bronze two years
later. The chairman of the Nuclear Medicine Department at
Kuwait University was on an advisory board of DuPont. Two
years before the Iraqi invasion, General Electric (GE)
proposed to Kuwait University that GE sponsor a research
program at the Nuclear Medicine Department to develop software
that would enable GE Nuclear Medicine Data to escape
restrictions of GE computer processors to other vendors'
computing facilities. Although Nuclear Medicine at Kuwait
University was willing to undertake the project, the proposal
was rejected by the University. The software was later
developed by a company in the Denmark -- PC Medical -- and it
is now being marketed worldwide.
Unfortunately, following the Iraqi invasion, the Nuclear
Medicine Department at Kuwait University lost its edge. The
losses of nuclear medicine equipment during the Iraqi
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occupation were minimal: two computers, and a gamma camera
from the military hospital which was strapped to a helicopter,
yanked out of place, and transferred to Iraq. The real losses
are in human resources: except for expertise in chemistry,
the Department had lost the personnel upon which its
competitive edge had rested.
What is needed all over the Arab world is leadership, may be
in new institutions that would be capable of rising above
political disputes, to nurture and embrace Arab intellectual
property at socially optimal levels; leadership that would
foster strategic alliances among organizations in the Arab
World and abroad to enable all to work together, to gain
access to technology and markets, and to accomplish objectives
of mutual benefit. The potential in the Arab World is
tremendous; the challenges to management are many.
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